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Intelligence without Essence:  
Rejecting the Classical Theory of Definition 
_________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract:  
 
What is intelligence? After three decades of academic research, we are no closer to answering this 
question. This article argues that using the Classical Theory of Definition – where one attempts to 
find the individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions of intelligence – is futile. In the first 
section I argue that because the term intelligence is relativized by groups of language users, it 
means different things to different groups. I then argue that the term is evolving quickly — due to 
the enormity of data generated online. It then goes on to advance the case for a new framework, 
drawn from Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, that seeks to classify 
“intelligence” as a family resemblance concept – moving beyond locating the “essence” of 
intelligence. 
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Intelligence without Essence:  Rejecting the Classical Theory of Definition 
 
 
“To show the fly the way out of the fly bottle” — that, Ludwig Wittgenstein said, was the aim of 
his philosophy.1 The comment, in Philosophical Investigations, was directed at his fellow 
philosophers – including his younger self – who get caught in seemingly escapable glass traps by 
covetously observing success in science, and its ability to give reductive explanations.2 The 
concepts Wittgenstein and his contemporaries were interested in, however, were highly resistant to 
the scientific method. Wittgenstein compared their endless struggle for a structured logical form 
applicable to everything to the fly, which constantly attempts to escape by slamming into the the 
inside of the transparent bottle. What was needed, Wittgenstein observed, was a way out – a 
liberation from the glass prison of pretend obstacles philosophers had put in front of themselves, by 
paying attention to the role concepts really play in our thoughts and language. “Don't think, but 
look!” Wittgenstein repeatedly bellows in Philosophical Investigations.3  
 
The approach Wittgenstein imparted to his peers is equally relevant to intelligence scholars today in 
the three decade-long definitional debate over the subject’s core concept. The failure of this process 
to provide a satisfying definition has produced, and been accompanied by, the persistent claim of 
“under-theorisation”. The way out of our fly-bottle, however, is not by discovering “new 
information, but by arranging what we have always known” – applying a new philosophical 
framework to the concept of intelligence.4 The previous philosophical framework, the Classical 
Theory of Definition, that attempted to locate the “essence” of intelligence is futile for two reasons. 
First, because the term is relativized to groups of language users – it means different things in 
different cultures. To illustrate this point, I will focus on perhaps the two closest intelligence 
communities, the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US), and demonstrate that profound 
differences exist between how intelligence is conceptualized in both states. I focus here on arguably 
the two closest intelligence communities, often referred to in a single breath as “Anglo-American”, 
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because definitions of intelligence from inside the Anglosphere present the most charitable case for 
detractors of my argument. If marked differences exist here, then greater variations will exist 
elsewhere. Second, I will show how the concept of intelligence has undergone changes due to the 
impact of datafication (primarily) and the drastic changes this entails for how intelligence is 
collected, secrecy and the shifting of ownership.  
 
After illustrating how the Classical Theory of Definition fails to deal with the complexity of a 
concept like intelligence, I will lay out the case for intelligence as a concept with “blurred edges”. I 
will draw on the Philosophical Investigations of Wittgenstein in an attempt to move past locating 
the “essential core” of intelligence and instead look for the “family resemblances” within the 
concept. 5 Through this final section, I will show how intelligence does not have just one essence, or 
no essence at all, but that it in fact has more than one, and that these “overlap and crisscross in 
complex ways.”6 
 
Before moving inside the Anglosphere – which will comprise the first section in my tripartite 
argument – it is necessary to show that contributors to the definitional debate in Intelligence Studies 
have attempted to apply the Classical Theory of Definition. Firstly, because writers on the subject 
have, for the most part, posited narrow definitions of intelligence, often as a prelude to positing a 
theory of how intelligence works. 7  Also, as I am arguing for an unbound concept with blurred 
edges, previous definitions and explanations over the failure to define intelligence is a logical place 
to start. 
 
The problem that won’t go away  
The debate within Intelligence Studies over its central conceptual term is by no means a discipline-
specific problem. International security experts have debated the term “terrorism” ad nauseam, 
while biologists have been at war over the term “species” for over two centuries.8 In contrast to 
these parallel debates over the respective essences of “terrorism” or “species”, scholars of 
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intelligence add that intelligence is under-theorized. In short, they posit the following: if we think 
harder we could get a better, more functional, definition of intelligence. In 1985, Walter Laqueur 
was one of the first to forward this claim, suggesting that “all attempts to develop ambitious 
theories of intelligence have failed”.9 David Kahn echoed Laqueur at the beginning of this century 
when he said “...scholars have called for a theory of intelligence. None has been advanced”.10 In 
2002 Michael Warner in “Wanted: A Definition of 'Intelligence’” also advanced on the same front: 
“As historian Walter Laqueur warned us, so far no one has succeeded in crafting a theory of 
intelligence”.11 The under-theorizing claim is not solely a US Intelligence Studies phenomenon. 
The same argument has been forwarded in the “British School”, which is more rooted in History.12 
For example, in 2004, Christopher Andrew, widely regarded as one of the Founding Fathers of 
British Intelligence History, argued that the subject was notable for its “under-theorisation”.13  
 
Despite this claim, on both sides of the Atlantic, serious theorizing of intelligence has taken place in 
the three main journals – the Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, Intelligence and 
National Security, and Studies in Intelligence – as well as sporadically elsewhere.14 Yet, despite 
these analyses on intelligence, the “under-theorisation” claim persists. This, however, is not 
surprising due to the philosophical approach adopted by almost all intelligence scholars: the 
Classical Theory of Definition. 15  Intuitively, when applying this theory, what one attempts to 
encapsulate in a definition is its defining characteristics. The Classical Theory of Definition does 
this by establishing intensionality – or, in other words – establishing necessary and sufficient 
conditions.16 For instance, with the example of a triangle, the definition sets out the individually 
necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for the correct application of the definiendum (in this 
case a triangle). Ergo, a shape cannot be called a triangle unless it (a) lies in plane, (b) is closed, (c) 
has exactly three sides, and (d) has straight sides. Each of these conditions is necessary for a shape 
to be a triangle; nothing can be a triangle that fails to satisfy all these conditions. Additionally, no 
subset of these conditions, i.e. one or a pair among these, comprises jointly sufficient conditions for 
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a shape to be a triangle.17 The total set of conditions, one to four, are jointly sufficient and necessary 
conditions for a shape to be considered a triangle. Anything that satisfies all four conditions is a 
triangle. A clear-cut and unproblematic case satisfies the Classical Theory of Definition.18   
 
Intelligence, on the other hand, is not as unproblematic and clear-cut – it is a sophisticated 
classificatory term. Creating a definition that uses the Classical Theory of Definition is a reductive 
exercise, such that when it is applied to a concept like intelligence, it cannot do justice to the 
various ways in which that word is used. Let us take Michael Warner’s definition from his essay 
“Wanted: A Definition of ‘Intelligence’”, as our canary in the coalmine. Warner’s definition is a 
good choice, as it is one of the most – if not the most – widely used and cited examples in 
Intelligence Studies. Warner defines intelligence as “secret, state activity to understand or influence 
foreign entities”.19 The definition is simultaneously too narrow and too broad to meet the criteria of 
the Classical Theory of Definition. Too narrow, because in the age of datafication intelligence is 
often un-secret and non-state. Warner’s definition is also too broad, as it fails to include counter-
intelligence or the expanding sector of business (competitive) intelligence. 20  His definition, 
somewhat uniquely, alludes to covert action – which partly explains its wide appeal – but puts 
intelligence agencies whose sole purpose is collection, secret or otherwise, outside the frontier of 
the definition. Clearly then, from its inception, Warner’s definition of intelligence was problematic 
when crafted to define US intelligence in 2002.  
 
It follows that the “under-theorisation” argument in intelligence studies is a symptom of applying 
the Classical Theory of Definition to complex terms when it cannot capture the multi-essence of 
intelligence across cultures and time. The theory perpetuates a constant pursuit of exactitude, and 
stimulates unceasing debates over what the specific properties of “intelligence” are, and why. Even 
subjects like biology – where there is no claim of under-theorizing in the understanding of a central 
conceptual term like “species” – are afflicted by this pursuit of false precision. The search for the 
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solution to the “species problem” within biology is instead motivated by the continuous search for 
more empirical evidence.  
 
The definitional problems, however, cannot be solved by more thinking – as suggested by the above 
intelligence scholars – or with more data – as forwarded by the evolutionary biologists – but by 
rejecting the Classical Theory of Definition. Almost no sophisticated classificatory terms have just 
one necessary condition, an essence. Instead there are sets of necessary and sufficient conditions, 
not ‘one thing in common which makes us use the same word for all – but they are related to one 
another in many different ways.’21 Wittgenstein called these phenomena ‘family resemblances’ – 
which we will return to after I have shown how the essence of intelligence has, and can, morph in 
different cultures and times. 22 
 
Culture and intelligence: disparities within the Anglosphere  
During the late 1970s, Roy Godson’s “elements” of intelligence were part of a conscious effort to 
create a measured debate about intelligence within higher education. Godson, working closely with 
Ray Cline, was reacting to the highly critical tone of the Watergate hearings and the associated 
season of inquiry into intelligence during that decade.23 However, even before Godson created a 
National Centre for the Study of Intelligence in Washington, individuals within the nascent US 
intelligence community were thinking about theories of intelligence. This reflected the fact that 
wartime agencies had raided US academia for analysts during the Second World War.24 As early as 
1946, Sherman Kent, the founder of the CIA’s in-house journal Studies in Intelligence penned a 
perceptive article which was published in the Yale Review. Kent identified an important 
inconsistency that existed in defining intelligence:  
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The main difficulty seems to lie in the word 'intelligence' itself, which has come 
to mean both what people in the trade do and what they come up with. To get this 
matter straight is crucial: intelligence is both a process and an end-product.25  
 
By 1949, in his ground-breaking book, Strategic Intelligence, the side Kent was on in this argument 
became clear. Kent’s conceptualization of intelligence had shifted more towards the notion of 
intelligence as an analytical discipline, embodied in his aphorism: “intelligence is knowledge”.26 
Philip Davies captures Kent’s view best by placing it in a comparative context:   
 
Since Kent’s day, many alternative approaches to intelligence have been 
suggested by a succession of authors. In his 1996 Intelligence Power in Peace 
and War, British scholar and former intelligence officer Michael Herman tried 
to present the range of conceptualizations of intelligence as a spectrum, 
ranging from the broad definitions that approach intelligence primarily as “all-
source analysis” (typified by Kent’s view) to narrow interpretations that focus 
on intelligence collection, particularly covert collection. Herman notes in 
passing that the broader interpretations tend to be favored by US writers and 
narrow approaches by the British.27 
 
Succinctly, British writing on intelligence tends to emphasize narrow definitions around collection 
and secrecy, whereas in the US broad definitions around analysis are seen as a constituent part of 
intelligence as a governmental information machine.28 This transatlantic difference is underlined by 
the observations of Ken Robertson, one of the first social scientists in the UK to study intelligence. 
Robertson placed a strong emphasis on the clandestine when he defined intelligence as ‘the secret 
collection of someone else’s secrets’.29 Similarly, the aforementioned Christopher Andrew defines 
intelligence as “to obtain by covert means, and then analyse, information which policy makers 
cannot acquire by more conventional methods”. 30  The focus of this definition is collection and 
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secrecy, with the analysis, grammatically within the sentence, taking the form of a weak 
interruption.  
 
By contrast, most US writers who move in the Kentian tradition tend to favor broader definitions. 
David Kahn, for instance, defines intelligence simply as “information” and laments “none of the 
definitions that I have seen work. It is like the term ‘news’. Though all but impossible to define, 
every journalist knows what it is: when something newsworthy is said in a court or a legislative 
hearing, all the reporters start taking notes”.31 Kahn was on to something important with his analogy 
to news. However, his solution – taking the broadest definition possible – creates a definition that 
cannot work because it is overly determined; something less than all “information” might be jointly 
sufficient to be considered intelligence. Jennifer Sims, a Georgetown academic who served in the 
State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence, also offers a broad definition of intelligence as 
something akin to social science, seeing it as “... the collection, analysis and dissemination of 
information on behalf of decision makers engaged in a competitive enterprise”.32 Again secrecy is 
absent here. Lyman Kirkpatrick, who as well as writing widely on intelligence has held numerous 
high-ranking positions in the CIA, strikes a similar tone by defining intelligence as: “the 
knowledge—and, ideally, foreknowledge—sought by nations in response to external threats and to 
protect their vital interests, especially the well-being of their own people”.33 Thomas Troy, who 
served as an analyst with the CIA for more than a quarter of a century, captures this best, suggesting 
that: “Intelligence, as a kind of knowledge, stands independently of the means by which it is 
obtained and the process by which it is distilled”.34 
 
The divergence between US and UK definitions is also clear when we consider institutional 
definitions. The British focus on secret collection while American definitions suggest that the role 
of the intelligence community is to distil information for policymakers. Directors-General of MI5, 
both past and present, tend not to emphasize assessment. In 1994, Dame Stella Rimington noted 
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that the role of MI5 was to “develop intelligence to the point where direct action to counter the 
threat is appropriate”.35 The current Director-General, Andrew Parker, echoes the same sentiment: 
“Covert threats to the UK's security can arise from many different quarters. Wherever and 
whenever they do it is MI5's job to be there, gathering intelligence, investigating and disrupting to 
protect the United Kingdom”.36 Although neither was attempting to define intelligence, both make a 
crucial distinction between gathering intelligence and investigating; Parker also notes security in 
respect to the threats being covert. The process of collection here is the core intelligence work, 
whilst the analysis forms part of the investigation. Meanwhile, conspicuously absent from almost all 
discussion of intelligence by British practitioners is covert action, a deliberate sanitization which 
has distorted our understanding of the subject.37   
 
Typically, the UK’s SIS defines intelligence as “Information acquired against the wishes and 
generally without the knowledge of the originators or possessors. Sources are kept secret from 
readers, as are the techniques used to acquire the information. Intelligence provides privileged 
insights not available openly”. 38  Similarly, the UK Security Service defines intelligence as 
“information of all sorts gathered by a government or organization to guide its decisions. It includes 
information that may be both public and private, obtained from many different public or secret 
sources”.39  
 
What is clear from looking at these UK official definitions is the importance placed on collection 
and secrets. This is also reflected in the landmark 2004 Report on intelligence and WMD by Robin 
Butler, Britain’s most experienced Downing Street mandarin. It explained that to supplement their 
knowledge, “governments turn to secret sources. Information acquired against the wishes and 
(generally) without the knowledge of its originators or possessors is processed by collation with 
other material, validation, analysis and assessment and finally disseminated as ‘intelligence’”.40 To 
further make the point clear, the report makes reference to the relative neglect of assessment within 
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the UK system, a point also made by the Franks Report into the intelligence background to the 
Falklands War. 41  The main outcome of the Butler report was to create a Professional Head of 
Intelligence Analysis to try and improve UK assessment, but within a few years, the UK obsession 
with secret collection re-asserted itself and the post was quietly abolished.42 
 
By contrast, America’s highest intelligence authority, the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence, prefers broader definitions that emphasize a blend of analysis and assessment. Citing 
the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, it insisted that National Intelligence 
and the term “intelligence related to national security” refers to all intelligence, “regardless of the 
source from which it is derived” and includes information gathered within or outside the U.S. that 
pertains to: “(1) Threats to the U.S., its people, property, or interests; (2) The development, 
proliferation, or use of weapons of mass destruction; or (3) Any other matter bearing on U.S. 
national homeland security”.43 
 
Definitions offered by individual US agencies such as the CIA and FBI also reflect this emphasis on 
analysis. The CIA argues that: “Quite simply, intelligence is the information our nation’s leaders 
need to keep our country safe. The employees of the CIA provide intelligence to the President, the 
National Security Council, and all other government officials who make and carry out US national 
security policy”.44 The FBI strike a similar tone, “Simply defined, intelligence is information that 
has been analyzed and refined so that it is useful to policymakers in making decisions—specifically, 
decisions about potential threats to our national security”.45 Both emphasize information that has 
been analyzed to assist officials who carry out wider security policy. Other than agreeing on the 
importance on providing insight, the divergence between the UK and the US is striking. The 
distinction goes right to the top: British prime ministers have long enjoyed a supply of raw 
reporting while American presidents have tended to be fed pre-digested material in the form of the 
President’s Daily Brief.46 
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Despite the fact that the UK and US are the two most closely integrated intelligence communities, 
their definition of intelligence is not shared. Notwithstanding a long historical association and a 
shared commitment to democracy, the essences of their respective concepts of intelligence differ. 
Like Rugby and American Football: both are games, both share common lineage, are full contact 
sports, have similar rules, tactics, structures, equipment and governing bodies – however avid 
spectators of either sport would tell you, likely in great detail, how different the sports are from one 
another. The lack of convergence in the UK and US highlights distinctions in national concepts of 
intelligence; and, a fortiori, if such disparities are present between these two closely linked states, a 
definition will not be shared between the UK and Russia, or the US and China. Both John Dziak 
and Ray Godson have categorized Russia as a “counterintelligence state” in which intelligence 
agencies have evolved out of an almost paranoid concern about threats to the regime rather than the 
need to provide information for decision-makers.47 In short, each local definition, concept or theory 
of intelligence has its own unique values, social customs and historical narrative that precipitate the 
national perception of how intelligence should be conceived — the culture defines the craft.  
 
“Datafication” & Mass Surveillance: intelligence evolving  
The Internet is now the primary means for humans to exchange data. Most people now accept that 
the Internet has commenced a new age of global communication in the twenty-first century, but 
what few people realize is that Internet use is still rapidly accelerating. By the end of 2014, there 
were almost three billion Internet users, two-thirds of them coming from the developing world; and 
in developing countries, the number of Internet users has doubled in only five years, from 974 
million in 2009 to 1.9 billion in 2014.48 In August 2012 Amit Singhal – a Senior Vice President at 
Google and the man, with his team, responsible for the Google search algorithms – disclosed that 
Google's search engine crawls 20 billion sites a day and processes 100 billion searches every 
month. 49  Singhal’s figure was confirmed by Google Zeitgeist 2012, which reported 1.2 trillion 
 12 
searches for 2012.50 Facebook, as of December 2015, has 1.04 billion daily active users and 1.59 
billion monthly users on average – meaning just under a fifth of the world population are registered 
on the website.51  
 
The growing number of individuals exchanging data on various platforms online has fundamentally 
changed how, when and from whom intelligence is collected. The twenty-first century is a digital 
book and anything from trivialities, like your most-read news items, to more personal information, 
like medical records, is stored on computers with the majority of this data accessible virtually. One 
of the biggest consequences of this is that intelligence agencies no longer “own” intelligence, with 
large swaths of collection and analysis being performed by privately held companies often outside 
the yoke of a nation’s states legal framework. Indeed, Warner notes in his latest book that this 
“democratized form of intelligence” is here to stay, with the repercussions being the disintegration 
of a state monopoly on intelligence.52  With information moving from being stored in vaults to 
clouds, Western intelligence communities have followed suit and are now funneling ever- increasing 
resources into online spying platforms and Signals (SIGINT) intelligence agencies have shifted 
much of their attention to data mining from sources that are open or that have only limited 
protection. Another reverberation of this is an increase in surveillance and counter-terrorism 
operations; and a corresponding decrease in Cold War style counter- intelligence operations against 
agents with deep cover.53  
 
The Internet is low-hanging fruit for intelligence agencies. The profound changes resulting from 
datafication present an unprecedented opportunity for intelligence communities to gather 
information. New forms of Social media (Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, etc.) are the largest and 
most dynamic evidence-based platforms ever created. Consequently, they also provide for the 
possibility of studying human behavior and the understanding of groups, movements or societies. 
Datafication, however, also represents an enormous threat. With such an explosion of information, 
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the problem of managing, manipulating and analyzing data can overwhelm. Intelligence analysts 
can overload on information and vital details can be missed against a blizzard of background noise.  
 
The US intelligence community was not caught totally unawares by these technological changes. 
Over more than a half a century, big data has played an important role in intelligence collection. 
This is especially true within the US, where the biggest collector of intelligence and employer of 
mathematicians and science PhDs is the National Security Agency.54 The inability of the Central 
Intelligence Agency in the early days of the Cold War to recruit human agents within secure police 
states like the Soviet Union and China contributed to the US focus on building up expertise in 
technical intelligence of many kinds. However, despite this historic technological advantage which 
the US had over the Soviet Union, it was not until after 11 September 2001 that the role these major 
technological developments had played on intelligence became visible, since it was at this point that 
the focus shifted from states and armies to people and transnational violent actors. Accordingly, a 
combination of factors in the post-9/11 world, including leaps in technology, (predominantly in 
analysis), new adversaries and the rush by individual citizens to embrace social media, pushed 
intelligence into uncharted territory. The intersecting of these three factors created a different 
environment from the ones that states had operated within during the Cold War, and advocates for 
updating our understanding intelligence emerged.55 
 
The theorizing over the consequences of datafication has resulted in a fissiparous debate over the 
essence of intelligence, with divergent national responses to each new phenomenon. In the UK one 
of the leading advocates of the idea that datafication has fundamentally altered intelligence, David 
Omand, has described it as a move away from the days of the Cold War “secret state” to those of 
the media-age “protecting state”.56 By contrast, in the US, this change has often been seen through 
the militarized prism of a “revolution in intelligence affairs,” with a succession of editorials, 
articles, books and lectures on how to “fix” American intelligence for the twenty-first century.57 
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Deborah G. Barger, a former practitioner, in Towards a Revolution in Intelligence Affairs argues 
this quite emphatically, as do Louis Andre, Bruce Berkowitz, John Bodnar and William Nolte.58 
Other prominent intelligence writers have also reflected on datafication altering intelligence. 
Jennifer Sims, Michael Herman, Gregory Treverton, Michael Warner and others have contributed 
and acknowledged a change in the role of intelligence from the old Cold War paradigm, although 
they do not go as far as to call it a revolution.59 Much of the discourse in both the UK and US has 
focused on intelligence reform set against multiple wars in the Middle East and South Asia. 
Nevertheless, what cannot be denied is the accelerating influence of datafication on practices of 
intelligence towards something new in the West, but not necessarily in the old East.  
 
The contrast between NATO and old Eastern bloc states during the Cold War highlights how 
datafication is altering conceptions of intelligence in the English speaking world. One of the 
defining differences during the Cold War was the ubiquity of the Soviet Bloc’s internal ministries’ 
surveillance of their own citizenry. The German Democratic Republic’s (DDR) Ministry for State 
Security – the Stasi – at the extreme end of State surveillance, had 91,000 professional employees 
and some 174,000 informants for a population of barely sixteen million in 1989. This meant one in 
every 180 East Germans was an employee of the Stasi.60 This startling statistic not only reveals the 
depravity of the DDR, but the depth and emphasis it placed on surveillance. Today, Western States 
and large corporations have the capability to put in place surveillance architectures that Erich 
Mielke could only dream about. Due to the amount of time we spend immersed in virtual existence 
daily, if the State’s Security Service were so inclined, the Stasi’s notion of flächendecke 
Überwachung, or “comprehensive surveillance”, would be achievable.61 Surveillance capabilities 
today might actually be more frightening than in Mielke’s dreams. If I were shopping in the DDR 
and the merchant behind the counter turned out to be an informant, she could take note of my 
purchases. Her monitoring, without the will to record my visit and purchases, does not generate a 
searchable record or exist in perpetuity. Today, online merchants – or those employed to monitor, 
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from security officers to marketers – can store and generate searchable records of a transaction via 
open electronic network environments. That transaction can be combined with millions of others. 
Then, through data mining – the discovery of meaningful patterns through applied statistical 
analysis – exploitable “intelligence” can be generated.  
 
Western states are deeply immersed in the applicability of data mining. 9/11 devastatingly 
demonstrated how Al-Qaeda were able to exploit the legal distinctions between “domestic” and 
“foreign” espionage. In the post 9/11 security environment, governments poured significant funding 
and research into improving the capacity, sophistication and ability to capture new data – including 
the translating of phone calls, voicemails and CCTV footage. The decline of Al-Qaeda and the rise 
of the Islamic State (IS) has only further incentivized the combining of datafication and domestic 
surveillance, with thousands of European Muslims travelling to Syria, and millions of Syrians 
seeking refuge in Europe. Today’s surveillance horizon is vastly greater than the brick and mortar 
world of the DDR. Technology is getting faster, cheaper and easier to use, which is radically 
altering how we think about intelligence, what it can do and who it belongs to.  
 
Despite an increase in tempo, debates over the expanding surveillance state are not new. Every 
reform of intelligence in the US since the national security act of 1947 has confronted robust 
opposition deploring the rise of an “American Gestapo”. 62  What is new is who is generating 
intelligence; how intelligence organizations exploit everyday connectivity and the scale of 
surveillance. Most professionals readily accept that some two billion Internet users have little or no 
right to privacy or freedom of expression online thanks to pervasive surveillance or censorship63 
Moreover, governments’ appetites to surveil their citizens are ever-expanding. Companies that 
report on government demands for user data are increasing. Between 2013 and 2014, Twitter 
reported a 78 per cent increase; Google, a 14 per cent increase; and Facebook, a 30 per cent 
increase. Between 2011 and 2013, Microsoft reported 30 per cent growth in the number of accounts 
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affected by secret US Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) requests, while Yahoo said it 
was “troubled” by the 67 per cent increase in accounts subject to FISA orders between the first and 
last half of 2013.64 Peter Hennessy’s concept of a Protective State offers us a good conceptual 
framework for these ongoing changes. 
 
As hinted above already, changing technology alone is not driving the evolution of intelligence. 
Two other relevant factors are a change in primary adversary towards violent non-state actors and 
changing societal attitudes towards privacy. Hennessy puts the intersection of these three factors 
best: “The Cold War intelligence attack was state-to-state. The counter-terrorism attack has a 
multiplicity of targets, some of which are states, a source of inspiration and guidance through 
individuals and the internet, with followers and imitators across a large part of the globe in the form 
of loose networks or clusters of individuals”.65 Government assessments, senior officials, unofficial 
leaks and media reports corroborate this important point. Hennessy’s second, more nuanced point is 
worth exploring in greater detail; what he refers to as the inversion of the secrets and mysteries 
problem in intelligence. “Secrets” being things like orders of battle and the location and capabilities 
of offensive weaponry; “mysteries” being the intentions, plans or objectives of one’s adversary.66 
The inversion Hennessy and others have referred to is a switch from a Cold War intelligence 
paradigm, in which secrets could be acquired with relative ease and accuracy; whilst mysteries – for 
example, the intentions of the Politburo – were extremely hard to obtain and instead were often 
deduced by analysts in national intelligence estimates. Conversely, today the intention of IS and 
other extremist Islamist groups is well understood, whilst its secrets — where its terrorist cells are, 
what devices they plan to use and where they plan to attack — are of critical importance to 
intelligence communities in the fight against international terrorism, but are elusive. 67  This 
inversion has contributed to aggressive expansion of surveillance and what is considered 
“intelligence”. 68  
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The inversion of secrets and mysteries has also significantly contributed to the rise of the 
surveillance state in twenty-first century. It has underpinned an assumption that the gathering and 
analyzing of personal information is vital to national security. Some form of citizen surveillance has 
always existed - indeed the government’s role as watchman is one of its primary functions. 
Nevertheless, the scale of surveillance today is unprecedented. CCTV images, biometrics (such as 
fingerprints or iris scans), communication records and the content of calls, or more commonly, the 
outline of numerical or categorical data of calls, are all collected. The combination of WikiLeaks 
and most recently the Snowden leaks have irrefutably demonstrated the NSA’s and GCHQ’s ability 
to access various types of private information on the Internet via the PRISM and TEMPORA 
programs.69  
 
The revelations of these government programs have also demonstrated that datafication is a two-
way street, with nation states scrambling – and often failing – to maintain the secrecy of major 
intelligence programs. Some scholars, like Richard Aldrich, have gone as far as referring to the 
problem, from a nation’s state perspective, as a clear indication of the “death of state secrecy”.70  
 
Whistleblowers working within the American intelligence community and the exposure of a 
previously secret government program on domestic espionage are not new. Seymour Hersh writing 
on Operation MHCHAOS or Bob Woodward’s anonymous sources reporting on the Watergate 
scandal are two obvious examples. What is new, and staggering, is the scale. Allegedly, Snowden’s 
revelations showed that the National Security Agency has piggybacked on organizations like 
Google. Inside ISP providers and telecoms, unimaginable amounts of unencrypted data were 
available. NSA internal slides on PRISM showed that the agency could access data and perform 
“extensive, in-depth surveillance on live communications and stored information” with examples 
including email, video and voice chat, videos, photos, Skype, file transfers, and social networking 
details.71 Additionally, in the UK, GCHQ program, TEMPORA, uses intercepts on the fiber-optic 
 18 
cables that make up the backbone of the internet to gain access to large amounts of internet users' 
personal data, including recordings of telephone calls, the content of email messages, Facebook 
entries and the personal internet history of users.72 In 1971 David Ellsberg leaked 7,000 pages of 
material, known as the Pentagon Papers, to the New York Times. At the time, this constituted the 
largest single leak in US history. Snowden’s haul of documents, of approximately 1.5 million files, 
was of a different magnitude. We are in a “new era of exposure”, this time both governments as 
well and individuals are impacted.73 Reflecting on the 58,000 top-secret documents exposed by 
Snowden, Omand has noted that “not even the KGB in its 1950s heyday could have dreamed of 
being in a position to do so much damage to western intelligence”.74 If secrecy is fundamental to 
UK definitions of intelligence, then it is an increasingly scarce commodity.  
 
Getting the fly out of the bottle 
 
The previous two sections have showed how the boundaries of intelligence have “blurred edges”.75 
The first section demonstrated that the two closest intelligence communities – interpreting the 
opposing argument in logically the strongest version – have divergent definitions of intelligence; a 
difference in culture. The next section showed how datafication, primarily through the expression of 
surveillance, is having a profound effect on intelligence collection, ownership and the nature of 
secrecy; a difference in time. These two elements combined – culture and time – denote that the 
“essence” of intelligence is amorphous.  
 
Daphne Park, one of Britain’s most distinguished SIS operatives, once told the House of Lords: 
“Intelligence is a ceaseless underground struggle to protect British interests”. 76  The definition 
resonated with her audience, but this is precisely because its language was specific to a culture and 
time.  The more satisfactory a definition, using the Classical Theory of Definition, the more bound 
by culture and space it will be. Bearing in mind, however, the arguments in the previous sections, 
the reader ought to be able to identify their own issues with Baroness Park’s definition. The solution 
is not simply to widen the boundaries –applying a Kentian definition of “Intelligence as 
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knowledge” permits too many activities that would not be considered intelligence. Thus, by trying 
to locate the necessary and sufficient conditions of intelligence, you reach an impasse between a 
broad definition, which incorporates too much, and a narrow one, which includes too little. How do 
you adjudicate between them? If two intelligence practitioners gave you their definitions, how 
would you decide between them? Choosing either one results in an unsatisfactory bounded 
definition of and unbounded concept. This is precisely why intelligence must be seen as what 
Wittgenstein saw as a “family resemblance” concept. This is a claim previously unmade in 
Intelligence Studies.  
 
Wittgenstein was one of the most influential philosophers of the twentieth century. He is known 
mainly for his two works Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921) and Philosophical 
Investigations (1953), the latter of which was published after his death. Throughout Philosophical 
Investigations he was concerned with language and meaning, the nature of the relationship between 
language and reality, as well as the nature and limits of language. He proposed the idea that human 
beings engage in what he referred to as “language games” – the negotiation of linguistic meanings, 
mediated through the perpetuity of human social interaction. In Philosophical Investigations, 
Wittgenstein used the term “language games” repeatedly before addressing the obvious question of 
what he meant by it. At aphorism 65, in an Augustinian voice (basically, a dialectical tool 
Wittgenstein uses throughout PI where he writes as an imaginary interlocutor which frames his 
retorts that follow) “someone” asks him to define the essence of a language game. By “essence” 
Wittgenstein meant “what is common to all these activities”.77 Ergo, to all of language; putting to 
himself the question, what is the essence of language itself? Wittgenstein elaborated on what he 
means by “language games” by asking us to consider the proceedings that we call “games”: 
 
I mean board-games, card-games, ball-games, Olympic games, and so on. What is 
common to them all? —don’t say: “There must be something common, or they would 
not be called ‘games’”—but look and see whether there is anything common to all.—
For if you look at them you will not see something that is common to all, but 
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similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that…Look for example at 
board games, with their multifarious relationships. Now pass to card-games; here you 
will find many correspondences with the first group, but many common features drop 
out, and others appear. When we pass next to ball-games, much that is common is 
retained, but much is lost.—Are they all “amusing”? Compare chess with noughts and 
crosses. Or is there always winning and losing, or competition between players?...we 
can go through the many, many other groups of games in the same way; can see how 
similarities crop up and disappear.78 
 
Succinctly, Wittgenstein’s point is that as hard as one might try, it is not possible to come up with a 
single all-encompassing definition of a “game”. The Augustinian voice within the quote is the other 
important element to draw out: “there must be something common, or they would not be called 
‘games’”. Through this dialectical process, Wittgenstein is inviting us not to search for the 
“essence” of games, but to draw out our own thoughts and memories on games and what details we 
observe. To think about the many possible types of games – board games, card games, computer 
games, children’s games, etc. The possible intensions of a game – winning, losing, amusement, 
self- improvement, fun, etc. How many players? The types of strategies? The rules? Does one 
practice to get better? Etc. You can continue through many other groups and elements of games. 
What becomes apparent through this examination is that “we see a complicated network of 
similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities”.79 Wittgenstein referred 
to these overlapping similarities as “family resemblances”; “for the various resemblances between 
members of a family: build, features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, etc. etc. overlap and criss-
cross in the same way.-And I shall say: ‘games’ form a family”.80 Wittgenstein is replacing the old 
Platonic metaphor of “essence” and the Classical Theory of Definition’s list of necessary and 
sufficient conditions, with “family resemblance” for concepts like games that have no common 
feature yet resemble each other, like family units.  
 
The question now is whether intelligence is a “family resemblance” concept in the Wittgensteinian 
framework as he showed with games? To see if this is the case, we can establish systematically 
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whether intelligence has necessary and sufficient conditions, like a triangle, or whether it has none, 
like games. Before doing so, however, we must first catalogue various characteristics, or to borrow 
a phrase from Godson “elements”, typically linked to intelligence. The list is by no means 
exhaustive; it draws on previous Anglo-American definitions in this article, but it is comprehensive 
enough to see what Wittgenstein's aphorism could mean for intelligence: 
Collection/ing: 
Of Information 
From Observation 
From Information not available in the public 
domain 
Knowledge 
Foreknowledge 
Secret information  
Secret collection 
Information gleaned from an investigation 
Information acquired against the wishes of the 
possessors 
Open-source information 
Information both public and private 
 
Analysis  
Evaluated information 
Processed information 
Integrated information 
All-source analysis  
Is processed by collation with other material 
Assessment 
Information that has been analyzed  
Information that has been refined 
For the purpose of understanding  
 
Covert action  
To influence 
Facilitates foreign policy 
Secret state activity 
Government action 
Non-attributable activity 
Operations 
 
Initiated by: 
Organizations  
Nations/ State 
On behalf of decision makers 
A nation’s leader 
   
Against whom: 
Is against foreign governments 
Is against an enemy 
Foreign entities 
Covert threats 
In response to external threats 
 
For what ends:  
Protect a state’s interests 
Safeguard national welfare  
Protecting against threat 
To protect the well-being of one’s own people 
To support policymakers/ing 
For those engaged in a competitive enterprise 
To provide privileged insights 
To guide decisions 
To provide information for decision-makers 
To stop threats against citizenry, property, or 
interests 
The protection of a nation’s homeland 
security 
Information nation’s leaders need to keep our 
country safe 
Useful to policymakers in making decisions 
Is related to national security 
About potential threats to our national 
security 
 
Secrecy  
An underground struggle 
By clandestine means 
Against the wishes of its originators 
Without the knowledge of the originators 
Sources are kept secret 
Techniques are kept secret 
From secret sources 
 
Not secret 
Public or private  
Information regardless of the source  
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With this rather long list above – made up only of terms found within the Anglosphere – we can 
begin to see how intelligence can be approached as a cluster concept.81 The above list starts to draw 
out components that make up the “essence” of Intelligence. Some of the concepts flow nicely into 
each other, like collection and secrecy, as embodied in many British definitions. Others conflict, 
just like with games – American Football is full-contact, chess clearly is not. It is within the 
boundaries of a concept to contain both a characteristic and its opposite, as shown in the above 
taxonomy with intelligence and the element of secrecy within it.82 What also becomes clear is that 
intelligence has no necessary conditions. If you take an element out, say “analysis” or “secrecy”, 
both of which are regularly used as necessary conditions of intelligence, would what you are trying 
to define still be considered intelligence? For instance, if a government organization exists with 
some covert action function to counter covert threats? Moreover, would it be intelligence if an 
organization exists whose sole function is to collect open-source information useful to policymakers 
in making decisions? The outcome of all this is that no items on the list are necessary conditions. 
Virtually any one of them could be removed and you would still be looking at intelligence. 
Intelligence, therefore, like games, has no necessary conditions. It has no single essence.  
 
Adopting Wittgenstein’s approach to the intelligence definitions debate solves four problems within 
intelligence studies at once. First, those intelligence scholars above, and others, who have argued 
that intelligence is under-theorized, by embracing intelligence as a family resemblance concept can 
reinterpret the current literature as glimpses of different elements of intelligence. The “under-
theorisation” claim is largely borne from the idea that if a sufficient amount of theorizing had taken 
place, we would have a stronger grasp of intelligence, perhaps even a solid definition. It is 
important to re-emphasize here one of the points Wittgenstein goes on to make in PI: that we 
actually do not have, nor need, a definition for games. The same is true for intelligence, as even 
without a definition, we use and apply the word successfully. Intelligence scholars, even young 
scholars on undergraduate intelligence modules, understand what is being discussed during 
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seminars. We can intuitively identify correct and inaccurate uses of “intelligence” without a list of 
necessary and sufficient conditions for the application of the concept.   
 
Second, a family resemblance concept also means that multiple definitions, and previous articles 
forwarding them, are compatible with one another. It is important to point out here that I am not 
suggesting a pluralistic understanding of intelligence. The suggestion here is not that all definitions 
are equally legitimate. The advantage of a Wittgensteinian approach is that a definition’s strength is 
predicated on the interest of the investigator. So, if the researcher were interested in the relationship 
between government, secrecy and intelligence, definitions that incorporate secrecy and government 
would be pertinent. What I am saying here is that intelligence represents one large cluster of 
different, sometimes conflicting, elements. As such, this cluster of elements is a loose one, 
connecting a series of crisscrossing short and long threads, which – again – do not go through every 
single instantiation of the definition. Just because we cannot draw a precise line around intelligence, 
it does not follow that there are no distinctions and that everything can be accommodated. 
 
Third, those on a definitional quest in search of a “real” definition of intelligence – an absolute 
metaphysical realm where words have “true” meaning – can stop. Equally, those attempting to 
discover an intensional definition of intelligence, using the Classical Theory of Definition, ought to 
also move over to viewing intelligence as a cluster concept. This approach is not just more realistic 
in terms of language, but allows for nuance that eliminates the endless squabbles over “what 
intelligence is” and what it is not.  
 
This brings me to my fourth advantage, the ability to delineate boundaries on subsets of family 
resemblance concepts for practical purposes. For example, in the cases Warner highlights in his 
article, where a definition is needed to help guide covert action, declassification or oversight.83 For 
those purposes you can always construct a stipulative definition that does not need to be universal.84 
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Even if it were possible to create a definition of intelligence with all known extensions stated, it 
would be of no use for guiding covert action, declassification policy or oversight as it would be too 
broad. What is important in the three examples Warner provides is that those performing 
intelligence must be clear in their own minds — and make clear to those who provide oversight — 
what is meant by the term “intelligence” in the context of the task at hand.  
 
Conclusion 
Trying to construct an intensional definition of intelligence, which shifts from culture to culture and 
adjusts with the ebb and flow of time, is an impossibility. However, this is not necessary for the 
concept to be usable. Indeed, as Wittgenstein said, sometimes “a concept with blurred edges” is 
exactly what is needed.85 Sherman Kent was correct in 1955 when he said that intelligence had a 
theory, craft and doctrine but what it needed was a body of literature.86 This has been, and is being 
created over the past half century. That does not mean it cannot be refined and expanded upon. 
Equally, it also does not mean that just because there is no agreed-upon intensional definition of 
intelligence, the literature and lexical definitions provided so far are wrong. They provide limited 
glimpses into the essence of intelligence as relative to a particular time and place. We simply have 
to accept the varieties of meaning attached to the same term in different cultures and times. This is 
especially important if we are to embrace the important exhortations of Davies and Gustafson and 
move the study of intelligence outside the Anglosphere.87  
 
It is also worth noting that even if intelligence is thought of as a “cluster concept”, the definitional 
debate within Intelligence Studies will not disappear, nor is this outcome desirable. Though 
intelligence scholars may be bored by talks at conferences and articles in journals and books, the 
debate is a vital one for undergraduates studying intelligence for the first time. Even for seasoned 
academics in the field, the continued debate is useful for the reconsideration of first principles and 
the identification of new threads running through the many things we call “intelligence”, and where 
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these threads overlap and crisscross in complex ways. 88  What will disappear, however, is the 
persistent claim of under-theorizing within Intelligence Studies.  
 
The fifty-year fruitless quest for a satisfactory definition of “terrorism” should stand as a warning to 
those in search of universally acceptable terms. It is to be hoped that scholars of intelligence studies 
do not follow the same path. Meanwhile we have an attractive alternative. In place of a broad, all-
encompassing definition of intelligence across cultures, borders and epochs we are best using 
Wittgenstein’s family resemblance concept. Constructing a dogmatic definition which is 
sufficiently broad to encompass all uses of intelligence in the US, let alone the rest of the world, 
would be so broad as to fulfil Wilhelm Agrell’s axiom: “When everything is intelligence - nothing 
is intelligence”.89 For academics engaged in the definitions of intelligence debate, there is no non-
arbitrary way of selecting one definition for everyone everywhere. Fortunately, Wittgenstein has 
showed us the way out of the fly bottle.  
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